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Abstract — In this paper, we analyze the structural 
change in the supply chain of oil palm in North 
Sumatra, Indonesia, especially after the financial crisis 
of the late 20
th century. 
We first describe the past and present market 
structure and conduct of oil palm industries in North 
Sumatra with an industrial organization approach based 
on our field study. The analysis reveals that the supply 
chain of oil palm in North Sumatra has changed such 
that farmers had more power to determine FFB prices 
over crushing companies, especially from 2001 through 
2004. However, farmers lost bargaining power during 
2007-2008 due to a decrease in palm oil demand, 
plunging of palm oil prices, and a regulation imposed 
upon crushing companies by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
To analyze such structural changes empirically, we 
test the existence of Asymmetric Price Transmission 
(APT), in which the speed of adjustments of the output 
price after the input price increases or decreases is 
different; the existence of APT implies the existence of 
market power. We apply the (Momentum) Threshold 
Autoregressive ((M-)TAR) model to estimate APT. 
According to the estimation results, crushing companies 
had more power to determine FFB prices over farmers 
until around March 2002. This situation changed such 
that farmers had more bargaining power from around 
April 2002 to around April 2007 before the power 
became balanced. The structural change test also shows 
these time points as optimal structural change points. 
The APT estimation, however, has little rigorous 
theoretical background, and the concept of APT is not 
necessarily related to market power. Hence, we next 
analyze the market power of crushers and farmers both 
theoretically and empirically. The estimation result of 
market power indicates that the farmers had no market 
power before the third quarter of 2002, but they did 
have market power from the next quarter to the first 
quarter of 2008, after which time they again lose market 
power. These empirical results are consistent both with 
each other and with the descriptions of the structural 
change. 
Finally, we conclude and draw some implications for 
farmers, crushers, and consumers of palm oil. 
Keywords— Indonesian palm oil, market power, 
Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT), (Momentum) 
Threshold Autoregressive ((M-)TAR) model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2004, palm oil has become the most produced 
of all vegetable oils, followed by soybean oil. 
According to FAOSTAT, world palm oil production in 
2008 was 38.9 million tons, which is about 30 percent 
of all vegetable oil produced. The two major producers 
of palm oil are the countries of Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Indonesia became the world's largest palm 
oil producer in 2006, with a global share of about 43 
percent in 2008. 
In Indonesia, Sumatra Island has been the main 
production area of palm oil since the colonial period. 
On the island, North Sumatra province led Indonesia’s 
palm oil production until approximately 2005
1  in 
terms of both oil palm-planted areas and crude palm 
oil (CPO) production (DGE [1]). CPO production 
from North Sumatra totaled 1.00 million tons in 1984 
out of Indonesia’s total production of 1.15 million 
tons. In 2008, it produced 2.74 million tons out of 
17.54 million tons. CPO production in North Sumatra 
has increased, although the production in Indonesia 
outpaced North Sumatra. 
Fig. 1 shows the change of CPO production in 
North Sumatra for each sector: government-owned 
companies, private companies, and smallholders. CPO 
production in North Sumatra had been led by the 
government-owned company, PT Perkebunan 
                                                           
1  Riau province has been the largest CPO producer, and North 
Sumatra has been the second largest since 2006. 
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Nusantara (PTPN). Oil palm-planted areas of PTPN 
expanded from 1968 with a government investment 
policy and World Bank assistance. Starting in 1986, 
CPO production by private companies increased as the 
 
Fig. 1 CPO Production by Each Sector in North Sumatra 
Source: DGE [1] 
 
government encouraged private companies to develop 
oil palm-planted areas and establish crushing factories 
(Larson [2] and Casson [3]).  
In recent years, however, the share of smallholders’ 
oil palm in CPO production has increased in North 
Sumatra. Smallholders are mostly mentioned in the 
literature as the “plasma” of the Nucleus Estate and 
Smallholder (NES) scheme, which was implemented 
by the government from 1979 to 2001 to foster oil 
palm smallholders
2. The increase in CPO production 
by smallholders was not ascribed to these plasma 
farmers, but to independent smallholders, who have 
no direct linkage to nucleus companies. Unlike the 
plasma farmers, independent smallholders have no 
obligation to sell Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) to their 
designated crushing companies. An appearance or 
                                                           
2    NES was a governmental policy of immigration and 
smallholder cultivation in conjunction with the financial support 
of the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and the 
Indonesian government, in which 2 ha of farmlands (plasma 
area) plus, in some cases, additional land for cash crops and 
houses, are allocated for smallholders around the company-
owned farmland (nucleus area). Details are in Larson [2], 
Casson [3], Zen et al. [4], Vermeulen and Goad [5], Barlow et 
al. [6], etc. 
increase in independent smallholders might cause 
changes in the market structure of FFB. 
In this paper, we analyze the structural change in 
the supply chain of oil palm (FFB) in North Sumatra, 
especially after the financial crisis during the end of 
20
th century. This supply chain includes the 
production of FFB, the distribution of FFB, and the 
crushing of FFB for producing CPO. Although the 
government-owned and private companies are able to 
produce, distribute, and crush FFB in their own 
chains, smallholders (both plasma and independent) 
are generally unable to crush, or sometimes distribute, 
FFB. We focus on the supply chain such that 
smallholders produce FFB, smallholders or 
middlemen distribute FFB, and crushing companies 
(both government-owned and private) crush FFB, 
which they purchase from smallholders or middlemen. 
The share of smallholders in CPO production has 
increased and reached about 40 percent in both North 
Sumatra and Indonesia in 2008; however, the 
intracompany transactions are not easy to analyze and 
may be assumed to be stable over time. 
Several previous studies postulate that crushing 
companies act in a less competitive manner to 
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determine FFB prices rather than farmers. For 
example, Maryadi et al., [7] analyze the FFB price 
determination process in South Sumatra and conclude 
that, although by law, the FFB purchasing price 
should be determined by the pricing team, nucleus 
companies actually determine the prices based on 
their own calculation. They also point out that the 
calculation of costs remains unclear and that the ratio 
of FFB purchasing price and the FFB-based ex-
factory price of CPO is set low, which leads to the 
underestimation of the amount of money farmers 
receive. Susila [8] shows that FFB purchasing price 
decreased in 2001 compared to the crushing capacity 
in Riau and West Sumatra due to overproduction, and 
the farmers who were not in plasma areas had less 
power to determine the FFB price and quantity than 
did buyers. Zen et al. [4] also point out that plasma 
farmers can sell FFB at higher prices and obtain 
higher profits than non-plasma farmers. Furthermore, 
Chalil [9] estimates the market power of the CPO 
industry in Indonesia and finds that private companies 
had market power, while government companies, 
which held higher market share and were highly 
vertically integrated, did not. These existing studies 
assume the NES scheme, which, in these days, is 
nonexistent in North Sumatra, where FFB prices are 
basically determined in the market and cover a period 
of time up until the early 2000s. Therefore, the current 
situation is not reflected, such as the impact of the 
increase in independent smallholders. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we 
describe the FFB collecting mechanism, market 
structure, pricing mechanism, and market conduct of 
oil palm industries in North Sumatra by using the 
industrial organization theoretic approach. We also 
interviewed farmers, middlemen, and a crushing 
company in Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra, 
in October 2009, and held similar interviews in Jambi 
province in May 2010
3. In section III, to analyze 
                                                           
                                                                                                
3  In Medan, we interviewed a small farmer and a relatively large 
farmer in Langkat district in the west of Medan, a middleman in 
Galang district in the east of Medan, who collects FFB from 
farmers to sell them to crushing factories, and a medium-scale 
crushing company in Medan, regarding the FFB collecting 
system, market structure, pricing mechanism, and market 
conduct. In Jambi, we conducted similar investigations with 
large farmers and a middleman in Batanghari district and a 
empirically the structural change in the supply chain, 
we conduct an estimation of asymmetric price 
transmission (APT), the existence of which has been 
studied to associate the imperfect competition market. 
We use the (Momentum) Threshold Autoregressive 
((M-)TAR) model, which is widely used in empirical 
analyses. In section IV, a theoretical model of market 
power is described, and the related empirical analysis 
is conducted to test the degree of market power and its 
changes. This analysis is performed because the (M-) 
TAR model lacks rigorous theoretical background, 
and the concept of APT is not necessarily related to 
market power. In section V, we discuss the 
relationship among market structure, APT estimation, 
and market power estimation to conclude this analysis. 
Finally, we show some policy implications drawn 
from the conclusion. 
II. SUPPLY CHAIN OF OIL PALM IN             
NORTH SUMATRA 
We first overview the FFB collecting mechanism in 
North Sumatra. The main purpose of this section is to 
ascertain who holds bargaining power over FFB 
prices and how the situation has changed, which will 
be analyzed empirically in the subsequent sections. 
A. FFB Collecting Mechanism 
The harvested FFB are transported to crushing 
factories within one to two days. Because FFB are 
perishable, they need to be crushed soon after 
harvested to avoid quality deterioration and a decrease 
in oil content. 
The FFB harvested in the plantations of 
independent smallholders are delivered to various 
crushers depending on certain conditions, which 
include offered prices, the quality crushers request, 
distance to factories, and other constraints. One of the 
critical constraints is the amount of FFB sales. 
According to our field study, in some areas, the 
minimum sales volume is predetermined, in which 
case smallholders whose sales volume is less than 15 
tons are unable to sell FFB directly to crushers. In this 
case, smallholders need to sell FFB to middlemen, and 
 
small farmer who was a plasma and now is an independent in 
Muara Jambi district. 
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then the middlemen sell them to crushers. In other 
areas, smallholders can sell FFB directly to crushers 
if they pay a certain amount of fees to the subsidiary 
of the crushers or cooperatives, even if they sell less 
than 15 tons at a time. However, because farmers 
need to use large trucks to transport FFB to 
crushing factories, from a standpoint of 
transportation costs, direct sales are limited to 
relatively large farmers and most small farmers 
need to sell FFB to middlemen.  
B. Market Structure 
In Fig. 2  we can confirm that the number of 
farmers has increased, especially after 2000 and 
2004, whereas the number of crushing companies 
was 116 in 2000 and decreased to 86-92 in and after 
2002. During this time, the number of farmers in 
North Sumatra grew from around 50,000 to 80,000 in 
2000 and continued to increase starting in 2004. The 
number of farmers reached more than 150,000 in 
2006.  
As mentioned in the previous section, Fig.1 shows 
the change of CPO production of smallholders, 
government-owned companies, and private 
companies. Because processed FFB quantity is 
basically proportional to CPO production, the figure 
also reveals the share of each sector in the FFB 
market. According to the figure, the FFB production 
of smallholders has increased since 2001, whereas the 
production of the government-owned and private 
companies has decreased since 2001 and 2004, 
respectively. This finding suggests that crushing 
companies cut back the procurement of FFB from 
their own plantations and increased purchasing from 
smallholders in the industry level. This behavior 
might have led to an increase in demand of FFB from 
independent smallholders, and hence, the increase in 
the market share of smallholders in the FFB market, 
especially from 2001-2004. 
In our field study, the large farmer in Langkat 
district observed 5 factories in his neighborhood in 
October 2009, while there were only 2 factories 15 
years prior. This farmer believes the number of 
crushing factories has increased due to the expansion 
of plantation acreage and that it will continue to 
increase as the acreage expands. The middleman in 
Galang district recognizes that the number of crushers 
has increased and that the competition among crushers 
has been severe in recent years. Furthermore, the 
medium-scale crusher in Medan answered that, 
especially in recent years, even large crushing 
companies did not have the power to determine FFB 
prices because the number of crushing factories 
increased. In addition, because the CPO is also faced 
with competition from other substitute goods, the 
crushing industry is in a tough competitive 
environment.  
Our interviews also revealed that the number of 
middlemen has increased in the past 10 years. 
Although official statistics on middlemen are not 
available, the farmer in Langkat advised that the 
number of middlemen increased especially when FFB 
prices were high, which implies that new entrants 
accompany high CPO prices. The middleman in 
Galang is aware that the competition is becoming 
fierce and that he should maintain his volume of FFB 
by the loan system as described below. 
According to the field study, competition among 
crushing companies and among middlemen has 
become increasingly fierce. Although one statistic 
shows that the number of crushing companies has not 
increased very much, the number of crushing factories 
that farmers see seems to have grown. In addition, 
competition among farmers has been less fierce since 
2001-2004 because the demand for FFB produced by 
independent smallholders has increased, and the 
market share of such farmers has also increased. 
Fig. 
2 Number of Farmers and Crushers in North Sumatra 
Source: DGE [1] 
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C. Pricing Mechanism and Market Conduct 
Here, we present an overview of the pricing 
mechanism of the FFB purchasing price of crushing 
companies, which is the same as the sales price of 
farmers or middlemen. Then, we consider the market 
conduct of each actor in the oil palm supply chain. 
Maryadi et al., [7] explain that especially under the 
NES scheme, FFB purchasing price is calculated from 
FOB prices of CPO and PKO (Palm Kernel Oil) 
minus processing costs, depreciation, and 
administrative costs. Furthermore, because the NES 
scheme is rarely implemented in North Sumatra these 
days, the purchasing price of FFB is basically 
determined by a market mechanism. A crushing 
company in Medan recognizes that the determination 
of the purchasing price of FFB is transparent. They 
first calculate a price idea based on a formula for 
computing the price, which takes into account the 
production and processing costs. Then, they discuss 
the price idea with the farmers’ representatives once 
per week and determine the purchasing price based on 
the discussion. In this sense, FFB price is determined 
by negotiations between buyers and sellers, referring 
to CPO price, which is dependent on both domestic 
and international CPO supply and demand
4. 
Based on our interviews with middlemen and 
farmers, the middlemen’s margin seems to be 
constant. The middleman in Medan advised the 
margin is around Rp.300-400/kg. The smaller farmer 
in Langkat also advised the margin of his familiar 
middleman is stable, around Rp.400/kg. The 
middleman in Jambi concurred; his margin is constant 
at about Rp.240/kg, and he shows his receipts from 
the crushing factories to the farmers. Although the 
margin is constant, the middleman in Medan tries to 
secure as many FFB as possible by loaning farmers 
money because crushers pay him more (less) when the 
sales volume is more (less) than the contracted 
quantity. The middleman in Jambi also lends money 
                                                           
4   The domestic CPO market was regulated in 1978-1991; the 
government intended to impose a CPO price ceiling and to 
allocate supplies of CPO to domestic refineries through 
quantitative export restrictions (Larson [2]). The trade 
restrictions were removed in 1991 and an export tax was 
introduced instead in 1994. Because the CPO market was 
liberalized in 1991, we assume CPO price is determined by 
supply and demand in domestic and world markets. 
to farmers for buying fertilizer. Thus, some 
middlemen try to attract farmers by offering value 
added services, and they make a profit from the 
services instead of charging more for distributing 
FFB. 
Assuming the constant margin of middlemen, then 
who has more power to determine FFB prices? As 
shown in the market structure, farmers have an 
increased number of options for selling FFB, whereas 
crushers have faced increasing competition with each 
other, especially from 2001-2004, even though the 
numbers of both crushing factories and farmers 
increased. The farmer in Jambi, who was a plasma 
and is now independent, informed us that the 
purchasing prices of a government-owned nucleus 
company was usually less than those of other private 
factories. The implication is that independent farmers 
have more options for selling FFB compared to 
plasma farmers and have a potential opportunity to 
receive higher prices for FFB from crushers. We infer 
that crushers have lost power and that farmers have 
gained power in determining FFB prices since the 
2001-2004 period. 
The crushing company in Medan also recognizes 
that it is not easy to set lower prices because farmers 
and middlemen exchange price information frequently 
and they always choose the factories that offer the 
highest prices. This situation is also evident from the 
interviews with farmers; small farmers obtain price 
information from neighboring farmers and workers at 
harvest time, whereas larger farmers receive such 
information from several crushing companies on a 
regular basis.  
Such a situation, however, might change around 
2008 due to a decrease in worldwide CPO demand 
and the plunge of CPO prices in the latter half of 
2008. The world recession and sudden drop in 
commodity prices seemed to affect CPO and FFB 
prices and, hence, the bargaining power of oil palm 
farmers. As crushers reduced the amount of FFB 
purchased and imputed the lower prices to upstream 
industries, farmers were forced to accept the lower 
prices of FFB. 
Another reason for the decrease in farmers’ power 
to determine FFB prices may be due to a regulation 
imposed by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2007. In 
February 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture passed a 
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regulation limiting the number of entrants of crushers 
with no plantations, based on national law No. 18 in 
2004. According to this regulation (No.26/Permentan 
/OT.140/2/2007), for new crushers to obtain 
permission to build factories, at least 20 percent of 
FFB must come from the crusher’s plantation. Further, 
after obtaining permission, plantation companies need 
to have partnerships with smallholders in at least 20 

















Fig. 3 Positive and Negative APT 
Source: Authors (referred to Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel [11]) 
Note:  
1)   and   represent input price and output price, respectively. 
2)  Solid lines represent the price increase and dotted lines represent the price decrease. 
3) Price  change  of   is shown to occur at the kinked point of  , which is followed by the change of  . 
Price  Price 
 
Before this regulation was in effect, the number of 
crushers without plantations had increased. For 
example, as of 2005, 6 out of 9 factories in Jambi had 
no plantations (InforDev [10]). These factories could 
have offered farmers higher FFB prices than those 
with their own plantations because the costs of 
starting and operating plantations were not required. 
The crushing company in Medan also advised that 
smaller factories could be more competitive due to 
lower fixed costs. However, after the inception of the 
crushing industry regulation concerning new entrants 
without plantations, FFB prices offered to sellers 
might decrease because the crushers without 
plantations either incur additional costs to obtain 
plantations or withdraw from the business. Thus, there 
might be a reduction in the farmers’ power to 
influence FFB prices. 
In summary, according to the market structure and 
conduct in North Sumatra, we infer that the crushing 
companies lost power, and oil palm farmers increased 
their power to determine FFB prices after 2001-2004. 
However, farmers might have lost this power in 2007-
2008. We examine these scenarios by subsequent 
empirical analyses of APT and market power.  
III. ASYMMETRIC PRICE TRANSMISSION 
A. What Is APT? 
In this section, APT is used as one method for 
empirically analyzing the structural change in the 
supply chain of oil palm in North Sumatra. This 
concept is closely related to market power as 
described hereinafter. Based on the survey of Meyer 
and von Cramon-Taubadel [11], we employ the 
concept of APT in this paper as follows. 
Let us consider a price transmission in a stage of 
the supply chain where input price is the industry 
representative’s purchasing price from the upstream 
industry and output price is the industry 
representative’s sales price to the downstream 
industry. Price transmission is said to be asymmetric 
if the speed of adjustments of the output price after the 
input price increases or decreases is different. In 
particular, APT is positive if the output price adjusts 
more rapidly when the input price increases than when 
it decreases. A positive APT means that the squeezed 
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Fig. 4 FFB Prices and CPO International Price 
Source: See the text. 
 
margin. It also indicates that the price transmission 
has downward rigidity. In contrast, negative APT 
denotes that the output price adjusts more rapidly 
when the input price decreases than when it increases. 
Thus, the stretched margin is restored more quickly 
than the squeezed margin, and the price transmission 
has upward rigidity. We show the conceptual diagram 
of positive and negative APT in Fig. 3.  
Possible causes of APT include the existence of 
market power, adjustment costs, search costs, and so 
on. Most previous studies focus on the relationship 
between the existence of market power and positive 
APT, although the explanations lack rigorous 
theoretical underpinning (Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel [11]). Even though some theoretical 
approaches exist, such as Kovenock and Widdows 
[12], Damania and Yang [13], and Bunte and 
Peerlings [14], the number of theoretical studies on 
APT is limited, and the analytical results largely 
depend on the functional forms that researchers 
assume. In addition, a theoretical model that can be 
applied to empirical models, such as the (M-)TAR 
model, has not been developed yet. 
In the empirical studies of APT, the (M-)TAR 
model has widely been used because it can test 
positive and negative APT with less data. Plus, it 
takes into consideration the stationarity of time series 
data and conducts co-integration tests. Previous 
empirical studies of APT that use the (M-)TAR model 
include Abdulai [15], Ghoshray [16], Gonzales et al. 
[17], and Hassan and Simioni [18]. These empirical 
analyses, however, lack the background of economic 
theory and rarely find the relationship between market 
structure and APT in a rigorous manner. 
B. Empirical Analysis– Data and Unit Root Test 
The empirical analysis of APT uses two sets of 
price data in North Sumatra, i.e., FFB purchasing 
prices of crushing companies ( ) and ex-factory 
prices of CPO ( , FFB base).    comes from PT 
Smart.    is calculated by using the following 
equation (Maryadi et al. [7]): 
,  (1)
where   and   represent FOB prices of CPO 
and PKO, respectively, and   and   are 
the extraction rates (the quantity extracted from 1 unit 
of FFB) of CPO and PKO, respectively. The 
extraction rates vary with the age of the palm trees. 
Because the palm plantations on Sumatra Island have 
a long history dating back from the colonial period, 
many trees are over 10 years old with high 
productivity compared to other emerging regions such 
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as Kalimantan Island. Hence, we adopt the extraction 
rates of 10- to 20-year-old trees with the highest 
productivity specified by law, which are 21.25 
percent for CPO and 5.00 percent for PKO (Maryadi 
et al. [7]). FOB prices are calculated from the price 
data from PT Smart minus export tax, which 
represents the FOB prices at Belawan port without 
export tax.   and    include 120 samples of 
monthly data from January 1999 to December 2008. 
These prices are shown in Fig. 4  with CPO 
international prices. 
Provided the crushing costs are constant 
throughout the sample period, the relationship 
between   and   at  time    is expressed as 
follows: 
,  (2)
where   is the i.i.d. error term. According to Engle 
and Granger [19], if   and    are in a non-
stationary process and   and    are in a 
stationary process, i.e., they are first difference 
stationary (I(1)) variables, then the coefficient of the 
regression of   on   may have a bias due to a 
spurious correlation. If the residual   is stationary, 
however, then   and    are said to be 
cointegrated. Therefore, we need to conduct unit root 
tests and cointegration tests on   and  . We use 
the logarithm of both variables in the following 
analyses.  
According to the result of unit root tests shown in 
Table 1,   and    should be I(1) variables. 
Hence, estimating Equation (2) may be a spurious 




where the parentheses represent t-statistics. 
Next, we test the cointegration relationship between 
 and  , using the (M-)TAR model 
introduced in the next section. 
C. Estimations of APT using (M-)TAR Model 
In a TAR model, a cointegration test is performed 
by using    of Equation (3) in the following 





where   is the Heaviside indicator function, and   is 
the super-consistent estimator of threshold   
calculated following Chan [21].   is the white noise 
disturbance term, which satisfies the following 
conditions: 
. (1)
The necessary and sufficient condition of   to be 




for any  . 
(7)
Table 1 Unit Root Test 
ADF   PP 
Variable
        
  -1.459  0.553     -4.550   -1.492   0.537  
  -8.397*** 0.000 ***   -74.761 ***  -8.144 *** 0.000 ***
  -1.284  0.637     -3.406   -1.326   0.617  
  -9.377*** 0.000 ***   -93.151 ***  -9.308 *** 0.000 ***
 
Notes: 
1) In ADF tests,    is the Dickey-Fuller test statistics, and  -
 is the MacKinnon’s approximate   statistics.  
2)  In PP tests,   is the Phillips-Perron’s   statistics,   is the 
Phillips-Perron’s   statistics,  and  -   is the MacKinnon’s 
approximate   statistics. 
3) *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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  is the lag order that satisfies the conditions of 
Equation (6) and (7) and minimizes the BIC (Bayesian 
Information Criteria). 
A cointegration test is performed by testing 
; i.e., if the null hypothesis of 
  is rejected then   and   are 
said to be cointegrated. APT can be tested in the same 
model to compare the absolute values of   and  . 
If    is rejected and  , then it is 
shown that the negative discrepancies from the 
equilibrium error   12 
Table 2 TAR and M-TAR Model Estimation 
TAR   M-TAR 
Range 
      Asym.          Asym. 
1999.1-2008.12  -0.449 ***  -0.357 ***  15.09 *** 0.40     -0.270 *** -0.817 ***  2.75 *** 11.02 ***
(1-120)  (-4.12)  (-3.63)   (0.30)    (-3.38)  (-5.66)   (0.001) + 
1999.6-2008.7  -0.397 ***  -0.501 ***  15.66 *** 0.42     -0.330 *** -1.015 ***  22.64 *** 11.27 ***
(6-115)  (-3.69)  (-4.21)   (0.519)    (-3.95)  (-5.45)   (0.001) + 
1999.11-2008.2  -0.319 ***  -0.465 ***  11.2 *** 0.79     -0.308 *** -0.856 ***  14.95 *** 6.04 ** 
(11-110)  (-2.72)  (-4.00)   (0.375)    (-3.53)  (-4.18)   (0.016) + 
2000.4-2007.9  -0.502 ***  -0.393 ***  12.19 *** 0.36     -0.354 *** 0.803 ***  14.54 *** 4.05 ** 
(16-105)  (-3.70)  (-327)   (0.552)    (-3.61)  (-4.01)   (0.047) + 
2000.9-2007.4  -0.613 ***  -0.256 **  11.97 *** 3.71 *    -0.539 *** -0.206   11.55 *** 3.04 * 
(21-100)  (-4.44)  (-2.07)   (0.058) -    (-4.61)  (-1.36)   (0.085) - 
2001.2-2006.11  -0.610 ***  -0.244 *  9.53 *** 3.21 *    -0.571 *** -0.146   10.19 *** 4.29 ** 
(26-95)  (-3.97)  (-1.81)   (0.078) -    (-4.42)  (-0.91)   (0.042) - 
2001.7-2006.6  -0.569 ***  -0.170   9.95 *** 4.17 **    -0.495 *** 0.124   11.12 *** 6.04 ** 
(31-90)  (-4.30)  (-1.18)   (0.046) -    (-4.68)  (0.54)   (0.017) - 
 
Notes: 
1)   and   are the adjustment coefficients in equation (4).  
2)   is the F statistics of the test of the null hypothesis  . Rejection regions are based on Enders and Siklos [20]. 
3)  Asym. is the F statistics of the test  . 
4)  + means positive APT and – means negative APT. 
5)  *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
adjust more rapidly than the positive discrepancies. 
The implication is that the shock that decreases the 
margin adjusts more rapidly than the shock that 
increases the margin. That is, the price transmission 
shows downward rigidity, called positive APT. 
However, if   is rejected and  , then 
the positive deviations adjust toward the equilibrium 
error more rapidly than do the negative deviations. 
The shock that increases the margin adjusts more 
rapidly than the shock that decreases the margin. This 
results in negative APT, which indicates upward 
rigidity of price transmission. In the case of this paper, 
positive APT corresponds to possible crushers’ market 
power and negative APT corresponds to possible 
farmers’ market power. 
The M-TAR model is the same as Equation (4) and 
(5) except that   in Equation (5) is replaced with 
. The TAR model and M-TAR model 
correspond to the two asymmetric adjustment 
processes, i.e., Deepness and Steepness, respectively 
(Sichel [23]). In both models, however,   
indicates positive APT and when  , 
negative APT. 
In the (M-)TAR model, the estimations with 
approximately less than 50 samples may cause 
possible small sample bias. Therefore, we need to 
estimate the model within several time period 
classifications if we are to find the structural changes 
of APT in limited periods. Table 2 shows the 
representative estimation results of the (M-)TAR 
model within different time periods. These results 
indicate that    significantly from January 
1999 to August 2008, which implies positive APT, 
and   significantly from September 2000 to 
April 2007, which implies negative APT. Then, after 
April 2007, APT tended to be positive again. We also 
estimated the same models using various divisions of 
time periods, and then synthesized the movement of 
APT as one indicator
5, as shown in  Fig. 5. In this 
                                                           
5  The indicator is derived as follows. Let   be a “value of 
APT” weighted by the number of subsamples (denoted by  ) 
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figure, we find positive APT until around July 2000. 
Then it moved toward negative APT starting in 
August 2000 until it became completely negative from 
around April 2002 to April 2007. After 2007, the price 
transmission seems to be symmetric.  
We also tested the structural changes with the 
residual series obtained from the regression of 
Equation (3). The results of the structural change test 
based on the method of Bai and Perron [24] indicated 
that the optimal structural change points are June 2000, 
January 2002, and June 2007 (Fig. 6). These 
correspond well to the structural change points of APT, 
which were derived from the estimation results of the 
(M-)TAR model shown in Fig. 5. 
The APT estimation results imply that crushers had 
more power to determine FFB prices from January 
1999 to around March 2002. The situation changed 
around April 2002 and farmers had more power until 
around April 2007. After that, neither farmers nor 
crushers had bargaining power. Thus, the structural 
                                                                                                  
in subsample   at time   (month).   for every 
  if positive APT in either TAR or M-TAR model is 
significantly detected at least at the 10% level. Otherwise, 
  if negative APT, and  . The 
indicator is derived by summing   for  . Various 
subsamples are chosen so that    is not smaller than 50 to 
avoid small sample bias and to mitigate the bias of the number 
of  , which takes the value of 0, in each  . 
change proposed in the previous section is empirically 
confirmed in terms of APT. 
 
IV. MARKET POWER 
Although the (M-)TAR estimation result implies 
that the farmers had power to determine the FFB price 
from around April 2002 to April 2007, the relationship 
between APT and market power is not assured 
because the empirical model of APT is not designed to 
estimate its theoretical model. Furthermore, although 
the explanation that the positive APT is caused by the 
exercise of market power appeals intuitively, rigorous 
theoretical explanations have not built general 
consensus as we mentioned in the previous section. 
Hence, we are motivated to estimate market power 
directly and establish the relationship of market power 
estimation with an APT estimation. In this section, we 
review the theoretical model of market power, 
estimate the degree of market power based on the 
theoretical model and discuss the correspondence to 
the APT estimation results. 
A. The Model 
We illustrate a structural model, which is developed 
by Just and Cern [25], Bresnahan [26], and Lau [27], 
and is concisely explained by Buschena and Perloff 
[28] and Perloff et al. [29]. To focus on the industry-
 




Fig. 6 Structural Change Test 
Note:  The dotted lines represent the estimated optimal structural 
change points; June 2000, January 2002, and June 2007. 
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level market structure, we assume that all firms are 
identical and the products are homogeneous. 
The FFB demand function facing the sellers is 
To test possible structural changes of market structure, 
we can incorporate dummy variables in   such that 
(8) , 
where    is the FFB demand,    is the FFB sales 
price, and   is a vector of exogenous variables that 
affect the FFB demand. The cost function of FFB 
production is 
(15) , 
where   are dummy variables that take on the value 1 
during a specific time and 0 before that time. For 
example, if we use quarterly data and assume that the 
market structure has changed in the first quarter of 
2000 and the second quarter of 2005, then 
, where   from 2000Q1 
and    before the quarter, and   from 
2005Q2 and   before the quarter. In this case, 
the market power parameter,  , before 2000Q1 is  , 
  from 2000Q1 to 2005Q1, and 
 during and after 2005Q2. 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, Equation (12) 
and (14) are estimated with two possible structural 
changes incorporated in Equation (15). The structural 
change points are selected according to the empirical 
results of APT. 
B. Estimation of Market Power 
(9) , 
where   is a vector of exogenous variables affecting 
the FFB production cost. The profit function of the 
farmers is 
(10) . 
Introducing a conduct parameter,  , to nest various 
market structures, the first-order condition of profit 
maximization for the farmers is written as 
(11) , 
where   is the partial derivative of   with respect to 
, and   is the marginal cost. The left-hand side 
of Equation (11) is defined as “effective” marginal 
revenue (Perloff et al. [29]).    takes from 0 to 1, 
reflecting the degree of market power;   when 
the farmers behave competitively as  , and 
 when they use all their potential monopolistic 
market power because  . If  , 
then they exercise an intermediate level of market 
power. 
To estimate the market power parameter,  , we 
need to estimate Equation (8) and (11) simultaneously. 
The functional forms are selected as follows: 
,  (12)
where   is one of   and  is the i.i.d. error term. 
The cross term is necessary in order to identify  . The 
marginal cost function is  
.  (13)
By using these functional forms, the optimality 
condition (11) is written as 
(14)
Considering the correspondence with the APT 
estimation results and data availability, we use 
quarterly data from the first quarter of 1999 through 
the fourth quarter of 2008 to estimate the degree of 
market power of farmers. The endogenous variables 
are price and quantity. The FFB sales price data are 
calculated by averaging each three monthly data points 
whose source is the same as that of the APT 
estimation. The FFB quantity (or demand) data are 
generated by disaggregating the annual data using 
Denton’s method
6. To disaggregate the annual data, 
this method uses a different quarterly data point as an 
indicator. We choose real GDP of Indonesia as an 
indicator. Although we are forced to use an indicator 
of limited relevance to the FFB production, the 
movement of the disaggregated data looks rather 
natural responding to the original annual data. The 
annual data are calculated from the CPO production in 
North Sumatra with the constant extraction ratio of 
                                                           
6  We used the “Denton” package in Stata. This methodology is 
based on Bloem et al., [30] and Denton [31].   15 
21.25 percent, according to Maryadi et al. [7]. The 
annual CPO production data are obtained from DGE 
[1]. 
The exogenous variables in the demand equation 
are real GDP of Indonesia, real GDP of China, oil 
price index, food price index, and time trend. The real 
GDPs of Indonesia and China are deflated by the local 
consumer price index (2005=100). Because significant 
seasonal trend is detected in real Chinese GDP, the 
data are seasonally adjusted. The nominal GDP, CPI 
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Table 3 Summary of Variables 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Endogenous  variables      
  Real price of FFB in North Sumatra (Rp/kg)  2281.68  610.53  1308.98  4114.39 
  Quantity of FFB (1,000 metric tons)  3159.79  332.38  2750.67  3973.38 
Exogenous  variables       
  Real GDP of Indonesia (billion Rp)  654207.80  141070.90  431751.00  985592.00 
  Real GDP of China (billion Yuan)  3232.94  761.64  2072.85  4351.13 
  Commodity fuel (energy) price  index  84.64 48.95 23.91  223.77 
  Food price index  101.04  25.12  77.14  174.82 
  Real wage in rural areas (Rp/half  day/person)  15.81 5.30 7.88  25.55 
  Real TSP fertilizer price in North Sumatra (Rp/kg)  2947.10  531.99  2345.85  4489.57 
 
Source: See the text. 
 
and price index data are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. The 
exogenous variables that we use in the optimality 
equation are wage and fertilizer. We use the wage of 
harvesting in a half day per person in rural areas of 
Indonesia. The data source is BPS [32]. The data of 
TSP fertilizer in North Sumatra up until 2007 are 
available from BPS [33]. We generate the data in 
2008, however, by extrapolating the international TSP 
index data from the World Bank. Both wage and 
fertilizer data are deflated by CPI. The means and 
standard deviations of all variables are shown in Table 
3. 
According to the findings in the APT estimation, 
possible structural change points should be in 2000-
2003 and 2007-2008. However, because the estimation 
methods, data used, and the frequency of the data are 
different between APT and market power, the 
structural change points are not necessarily the same. 
Hence, we can be flexible in choosing the structural 
change points. The first possible structural change 
point is in 2002 when the APT changed from positive 
to negative. The second possible structural change 
point is in 2008 because the sudden FFB price 
decrease that year might squeeze the price cost margin 
of farmers. Therefore, we conducted the simultaneous 
estimation of Equation (12) and (14) by using 2002Q4 
and 2008Q2 as the structural change points in 
Equation (15), so that  and   are dummy variables 
that take 1 on from 2002Q4 and 2008Q2, respectively. 
The estimation result of the structural model using 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) is shown in Table 4. 
 is 0.022 with p-value 0.163, which means   is not 
significantly different from 0 even at the 10% level. 
Thus, farmers had no market power before 2002Q4. 
However,   is 0.035 and significantly different from 
0; the null hypothesis of    is rejected at 
the 5% level. In this case, the farmers had market 
power over the crushing companies from 2002Q4 to 
2008Q1, although the value of the market power 
parameter is small (0.087). Furthermore,   is -0.070 
and significant at the 10% level;   is 
not rejected (  decreases to 0.017). In other words, 
the farmers lost their market power from 2008Q2 to 
2008Q4. This result is mostly consistent with the APT 
estimation: the starting point that farmers had market 
power corresponds to the point that APT changed 
from positive to negative. The time point that the 
farmers lost market power should be close to that of 
the APT estimation. 
Other than market power parameters, FFB sales 
quantity and wage have significant effects on FFB 
sales price in the optimality equation. Intercept 
dummy variables in both equations are also significant 
at the 5% level, which supports the fact that FFB 
demand decreased in 2008 and that the FFB price level 
was significantly higher in 2007-2008. We can point 
out, however, that except for the intercept dummy 
variable, variables in the demand equation are 
insignificant. Signs are also different than expected in 
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China’s GDP and oil price index, although the 
coefficients are not significant. 
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Table 4 Market Power Estimation in Structural Model by 3SLS 
Demand Equation (FFB Demand)    Optimality Equation (FFB Sales Price) 
Intercept 1551.562   (0.237)    Intercept 4524.142  ***  (0.001) 
FFB Sales Price  -0.145   (0.687)    FFB Sales Quantity  -1.713  ***  (0.001) 
Indonesia's Real GDP  0.001   (0.461)  Real  Wage  106.750  *  (0.096) 
China's Real GDP  -0.051   (0.883)    Real Fertilizer Price (TSP)  0.125    (0.601) 
Oil Price Index  -2.976   (0.457)    Dummy Variable (1 after 2007Q1)  852.426  **  (0.040) 
Food Price Index  13.901   (0.277)      0.022   (0.163) 
Dummy Variable (1 after 2008Q1)  -725.163 **  (0.044)      0.035 ***  (0.006) 
Time Trend  15.409   (0.629)      -0.070 *  (0.051) 
Time Trend × FFB Sales Price  -0.004   (0.689)           
              
F-statistics 5.52        F-statistics 7.76     
p-value 0.00        p-value 0.00     
  0.489         0.419    
F test              
  5.820 **  (0.019)      0.130   (0.723) 
 
Note: Parentheses indicate p-values. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed the structural change in 
the supply chain of oil palm in North Sumatra, 
Indonesia, especially after the financial crisis, based 
on field surveys and empirical analyses. The key 
findings are as follows. 
First, we considered the past and present market 
structure and conduct of oil palm industries in North 
Sumatra with an industrial organization approach, 
based on our field study. The analysis revealed that the 
supply chain of oil palm in North Sumatra had 
changed such that farmers had more power to 
determine FFB prices over crushing companies 
especially from 2001-2004. However, farmers lost 
their bargaining power in 2007-2008 due to the 
decrease in palm oil demand, a plunge in palm oil 
prices, and a regulation imposed on crushing 
companies by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Secondly, the price transmission from FFB 
purchasing prices to ex-factory prices was estimated 
by using the concept of APT and by applying the (M-) 
TAR model. According to the estimation results, 
crushing companies had more power than the farmers 
to determine FFB purchasing prices until around 
March 2002, then the situation changed so that farmers 
had more power in determining FFB sales prices from 
around April 2002 to around April 2007. After this 
time, power became balanced. The structural change 
test also found these historical change points, in 
addition to the point when the crushers’ power started 
to decline, as the three optimal structural change 
points. 
Thirdly, because the APT estimation has little solid 
theoretical background, we analyzed market power 
both theoretically and empirically. The estimation 
result of market power showed that the farmers had no 
market power before the third quarter of 2002, but 
they did from the next quarter to the first quarter of 
2008; they again had no market power after the second 
quarter of 2008. Farmers in North Sumatra obtained 
market power possibly through the increase in planted 
areas and fierce competition among crushing factories. 
The Ministry of Agriculture’s regulation and a sharp 
price drop in 2008, however, caused excess profits to 
shrink, which led to the disappearance of farmers’ 
market power. 
Our analyses also produced evidence regarding the 
relationship between APT estimation and market 
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power estimation. Furthermore, findings from both the 
field studies and empirical results supported and 
corresponded to each other. Previous studies only 
provided analytical descriptions or conducted APT 
and market power estimations independently. Hence, 
little was discussed concerning the relationships 
between descriptive and quantitative analyses or 
between APT and market power estimations. From 
this perspective, this paper may have some 
contributions to the study of oil palm industries in 
Indonesia, APT, and market power. 
We draw the following implications from our 
research. First, farmers became better off around 2002 
from the perspective of APT and market power 
because they earned excess profits through the power 
to determine prices or a strictly positive price-cost 
margin. As we assume that the margins of middlemen 
are constant based on our interviews, farmers received 
all the benefits. Second, although either crushers or 
farmers have benefited when positive or negative APT 
existed, the excess profits of FFB/CPO producers may 
have caused an efficiency loss in the economy. Hence, 
under the existence of APT or market power in the 
supply chain of FFB, palm oil consumers such as 
cooking oil producers, the oleochemical industry, and 
other end users, even importers, may need to pay more 
than under no APT or a perfectly competitive market. 
Third, Indonesia has potential to expand oil palm 
production due to its vast, cultivable land. It seems 
increasingly difficult, however, to enter into and profit 
from the crushing industry due to severe competition 
and the bargaining power of farmers.  
Because North Sumatra has been a representative 
and the largest palm oil-producing province for a long 
time, this paper focuses on this province even though 
other emerging provinces and regions may have 
different characteristics. One possible future area of 
research could be conducting and comparing similar 
types of analyses on other provinces to help 
understand their differences. Another possible area for 
future research is to compare the price transmission 
and/or market power of palm oil exporting countries 
and importing countries. 
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